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Abstract
We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to
agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals
select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents’ performance. Agents’
performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a
principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts
combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive
use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical
findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.

KEYWORDS: Principal-agent models, incentive theory, non-monetary incentives, goal setting,
reference-dependent utility, laboratory experiments.
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1

Brice Corgnet: Chapman University, George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics. One University
Drive, Orange, California 92866. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute. One University Drive, Orange,
California 92866. Email: corgnet(at)chapman.edu. Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres: Bucknell University, Department of
Economics, One Dent Drive, Lewisburg, PA 17837. Chapman University, Economic Science Institute. One
University Drive, Orange, California 92866. Email: jgm023(at)bucknell.edu Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez: Nottingham
University, Business School, Nottingham, UK, Email: Roberto.HernanGonzalez(at)nottingham.ac.uk.

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Monetary and Non-monetary Incentives
Contract theory has traditionally focused on the design of monetary incentives as the unique
motivation tool. The premise of these theories, also known as the principal-agent paradigm, is
that workers will only respond to monetary incentives (e.g. piece rates, bonuses, stock options)
leaving aside the role of intrinsic motivators (see Laffont and Martimort, 2002 and Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005 for reviews). These theories commend a widespread use of monetary
incentives rewarding workers according to observable measures of effort. The predictions of
these models, however, are frequently at odds with observed labor contracts. One of the major
puzzles for this literature is to account for the rather limited use of monetary incentives in the
workplace. For example, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) report extensive evidence that pay is
much less sensitive to firm performance than what standard theories predict.
In this paper, we put forward that this discrepancy between theory and evidence may result
from principal-agent models neglecting important aspects of work motivation related to the use
of non-monetary incentives. Psychologists and behavioral economists (Deci 1971, 1975; Frey
and Jegen, 2001) have already challenged the idea that workers’ motivation relies exclusively on
monetary incentives. For example, self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and
Deci, 2000) posits a continuum of motivational states ranging from extrinsic motivation, in
which people are motivated by external factors, to intrinsic motivation, in which their behavior is
completely self-determined. In the workplace, intrinsic motivation is associated with high levels
of employee satisfaction, commitment, and wellbeing (e.g., Baard et al. 2004; Deci et al. 2001).
Self-determination theory suggests that intrinsic motives may alleviate the conflict of interest
between workers who supposedly dislike effort and employers who aim at maximizing firm
performance. This theory also explains why higher extrinsic incentives (e.g. monetary incentives
or managerial control) may undermine workers’ internal drives (see Gneezy et al. 2011 and
Kamenica, 2012 for reviews).
Even though a growing number of works in Economics have documented the effectiveness of
various forms of non-monetary incentives such as goals (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg and Kube, 2012;
Gómez-Miñambres, 2012; Corgnet et al. 2015a; Dalton et al. 2015; van Lent and Souverijny,
2015; Allen et al. 2016), status incentives (Charness et al. 2014), symbolic rewards (Kosfeld and
Neckermann, 2011), delegation (Fehr et al. 2013), autonomy (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or trust
(Dickinson and Villeval, 2008), little is known about the interaction between monetary and non1

monetary incentives. It is essential, however, to examine monetary and non-monetary incentives
jointly to provide guidance for practitioners who typically use both types of incentives.
1.2. Contract Design and Non-monetary Incentives
Our approach aims at incorporating non-monetary incentives in the principal-agent
framework by relying on the widespread and extensively-studied practice of “goal setting”. The
motivational effect of wage-irrelevant goals has been studied at length in the literature in
Psychology and Management (see Locke, 1996 and Locke and Latham, 2002 for reviews) and
more recently in the Economics literature (Wu et al. 2008; Goerg and Kube, 2012; GómezMiñambres, 2012; Corgnet et al. 2015a). According to Locke and Latham (2002) 90% of the
studies show a positive correlation between the use of goal setting in firms and workers
performance. The literature has, however, paid little attention to the study of the relationship
between wage-irrelevant goals and monetary incentives which seems essential to both incentive
theorists and practitioners.
Corgnet et al. (2015a) took a first step in that direction by studying the interaction between
monetary stakes and goal setting policies. They showed that goals tend to be more effective
when stakes are large than when they are small. The present work goes one step further by
studying the design of contracts that include both monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals.
From a theoretical standpoint, we modify the standard principal-agent model with moral
hazard (e.g. Holmström, 1979) by assuming that the agent has two sources of work motivation: a
standard monetary motivation and a goal-dependent non-monetary motivation. As a result,
workers’ utility not only increases when pay is high but also when goals are achieved. Extending
on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) we assume that agents are loss averse in the non-monetary
domain. In our model, this implies that the utility loss of falling short of the goal by a certain
amount is higher than the utility gain of producing more than the goal by the same amount. Our
theoretical contribution is to extend the principal-agent model to a case in which principals can
set both monetary (a fixed pay and a performance pay) and non-monetary incentives (wageirrelevant goals). We show that goal setting, by providing an additional tool to incentivize
agents, allows principals to achieve stronger incentives while making lesser use of performance
pay. One caveat with the use of goal setting is that agents will suffer a utility loss if they do not
attain the goal set by the principal. To compensate for that possibility, the principal will increase
the agent’s fixed pay when setting goals to agents. Therefore, goal setting generates a tradeoff
between lowering performance pay and increasing fixed pay to ensure agents’ participation. The
2

optimal contract is such that the decrease in performance pay made possible by the use of wageirrelevant goals more than compensates the necessary increase in fixed pay, thus reducing the
principal’s agency costs to motivate agents. Therefore, agents will exert more effort and
principals will obtain higher earnings when goal setting is present in the model. In the presence
of goal setting, the principal will thus be able to reduce the wage bill by substituting costly
monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives.
In our setting, optimal contracts typically rely both on performance pay and wage-irrelevant
goals. Our framework contrasts with models in which monetary incentives may undermine
intrinsic motivation. For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) stress the possibly negative effect
of monetary incentives on agents’ intrinsic motivation in a setting in which an informed principal
holds private information about the agent’s ability level. In their model, the crowding out of
intrinsic motivation arises because setting strong monetary incentives provides a negative signal
on the agent’s ability level which, in turn, may lead the agent to exert low effort. By contrast, our
model considers the commonly-studied case in which agents (not principals) hold private
information about their level of ability. In that case, performance pay does not signal low-ability
to the agent and thus does not undermine motivation.
We test our model conjectures using a controlled experimental environment in which we
recreate the essence of a principal-agent model with goal setting. We isolate the effect of nonmonetary incentives (goal setting) by comparing contract design and organizational production
in two separate environments: one in which goal setting is available to the principal and one in
which it is not. To that end, we use a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing
organizations such as real-effort tasks and on-the-job leisure (Internet browsing) (Corgnet et al.
2015a). This real-effort and real-leisure work environment has been shown to be suited for the
study of labor incentives in the laboratory (Corgnet et al. 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). In our setting,
the principal selects a wage-irrelevant goal in addition to monetary incentives which include both
a fixed pay and a performance pay, where performance pay states the share of total output
assigned to the agent as in standard linear incentive contracts. The agent then decides whether to
accept or reject the principal’s offer. In line with our theoretical conjectures, we show that goals
were effectively used by principals to motivate agents. Principals decided to set a goal in 84.5%
of the cases in which they were allowed to do so, in addition to setting monetary incentives. We
confirm the prediction of our theoretical model regarding compensation contracts by showing
that principals set weaker monetary incentives in the presence of goals than in their absence. In
3

particular, performance (fixed) pay for the contracts accepted by the agent was on average equal
to 40.4% (104.9¢) of total output in the presence of goals compared to 45.1% (98.7¢) in the
absence of goals. Despite weaker incentives and in line with our model predictions, agents
worked significantly more (28.1% more) in the presence of goals than in their absence.
Consistently, principals earned 17.3% more in the experimental design in which they were
allowed to set goals.
1.3. Related Literature on Contract Design with Reference-dependent Utility Functions
The specification of our goal setting model is motivated by the experimental evidence in
Heath et al. (1999) showing that goals serve as reference points consistently with prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Our approach thus relates to the works studying optimal
contracting in the presence of prospect theory preferences. In the Finance literature, Dittman et
al. (2010) analyze optimal executive compensation contracts when CEOs are loss averse. The
authors consider a typical CEO compensation contract with fixed wages, stocks and options.
Stocks are riskier than options but provide stronger incentives because they are more tightly
linked to the actual value of the firm. They show that in a standard principal-agent model without
loss aversion the incentive effect dominates the risk-tolerance effect so that the optimal contract
should only involve stocks, a result which is inconsistent with observed CEO contracts. The
authors also show that their principal-agent model can be reconciled with empirical evidence
when assuming that CEOs are loss averse. In that case, options become part and parcel of the
optimal contract because they provide insurance to CEOs against losses in case of bad luck.
Relatedly, de Meza and Webb (2007) argue that compensation contracts including bonuses may
be optimal when agents are loss averse with respect to a reference wage. The authors consider
the reference point to be either exogenous or given by the median of possible wages. Herweg et
al. (2010) consider a principal-agent model where the reference wage of the agent is determined
by rational expectations following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). The results in Herweg et al. (2010)
are consistent with de Meza and Webb (2007) as they show that bonus contracts are likely to be
optimal when agents are loss averse. In line with previous research, our model considers a
principal-agent framework in which the agent’s utility function is reference dependent. Unlike
previous papers, however, we study optimal contract setting in an environment in which
principals set both monetary and non-monetary incentives (wage-irrelevant goals). In our setting,
goals act as reference points for agents’ intrinsic motivation. We thus focus on the case in which
agents are loss averse in the non-monetary domain rather than in the monetary domain.
4

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our theoretical framework. Section
3 describes the experimental environment, procedures and hypotheses. Main results are exposed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop a principal-agent model in which wage-irrelevant goals act as
reference points for the agent. This model will help us derive a set of conjectures which will be
tested using experiments.
2.1. The Model
We consider a binary effort principal-agent model with moral hazard à la Laffont and
Martimort (2002). There are two types of agents indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} where 𝑙 stands for low
ability and ℎ stands for high ability. The principal does not observe the level of ability of the
agent but knows the proportion (𝜃 ) of high-ability agents in the population. Effort is denoted by
𝑒𝑖 ∈ {0,1}. Exerting effort implies a cost 𝑐(𝑒), where the cost of effort is normalized as follows:
𝑐 (0) = 0 and 𝑐(1) = 𝑐. Production (𝑦) is stochastic and can take three values {𝑦0 , 𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻 } where
𝑦𝐻 > 𝑦𝐿 > 𝑦0 = 0. High-ability agents can produce {𝑦𝐿 , 𝑦𝐻 } while low-ability agents can
produce {0, 𝑦𝐿 }. Effort affects production following first order stochastic dominance so that
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿 |𝑒𝑙 = 0) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻 |𝑒ℎ = 0) = 𝜋0 ,

and

𝑃𝑟 (𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿 |𝑒𝑙 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦 =

𝑦𝐻 |𝑒ℎ = 1) = 𝜋1, with Δ𝜋: = 𝜋1 − 𝜋0 > 0.
The agent is paid a wage (𝑤) from the principal according to a linear contract 𝑤 ≔ 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦,
where 𝛼 represents fixed pay and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] represents performance pay. We assume that 𝛼
cannot be negative, so that the principal cannot “sell the firm” to the agent. This restriction
implies limited liability of the agent.
The agent derives monetary utility, 𝑢(⋅), as well as non-monetary utility, 𝑣(⋅), which is
obtained from attaining wage-irrelevant goals set by the principal. We assume that the agent’s
monetary utility function is 𝑢(𝑤) = 𝑤. We define the agent’s non-monetary utility as a
reference-dependent function where the reference point is assumed to be a wage-irrelevant goal
(𝑔) which is set by the principal when proposing the contract to the agent. Our specification is
motivated by lab and field evidence (Heath et al. 1999 and Allen et al. 2016) showing that wage-
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irrelevant goals serve as reference points in a manner which is consistent with prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).2
More specifically, the non-monetary utility function, for a particular goal (𝑔), is given by
𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔), where 𝑣(⋅) has the following properties:
(i)

𝑣(0) = 0 (goal as reference point);

(ii)

𝑣′(⋅) > 0 (increasing in production given a goal);

(iii)

For all 𝑥 > 0, −𝑣(−𝑥 ) = 𝜆𝑣(𝑥) where 𝜆 > 1 (goal-induced loss aversion);

(iv)

𝑣′′(𝑥) > 0 for all 𝑥 < 0 (convexity for goal-induced losses), and;

(v)

𝑣′′(𝑥) < 0 for all 𝑥 > 0 (concavity for goal-induced gains).

For convenience, we will denote 𝑣𝑗,𝑔 : = 𝑣(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑔) and Δ𝑣𝑗𝑘,𝑔 : = 𝑣(𝑦𝑗 − 𝑔) − 𝑣 (𝑦𝑘 − 𝑔) for
𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ {0, 𝐿, 𝐻 }. We denote by 𝑈(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑔) the sum of monetary and non-monetary utility minus
the cost of effort:
𝑈(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑔) ≔ 𝑤 + 𝑣(𝑦 − 𝑔) − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖 )
Principals are assumed to be risk neutral thus maximizing expected profits which are defined
as the difference between the agent’s expected production and the agent expected wage. The
principal’s problem is thus to choose monetary incentives and goals that maximize expected
profits subject to incentive compatibility and participation constraints. For the sake of illustration
we will focus our attention on contracts that induce both low- and high- ability agents to exert
effort.3
2.2. Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: The Optimal Labor Contract
In Proposition 1 we characterize the optimal labor contract when principals set both monetary
incentives {𝛼, 𝛽} and non-monetary incentives (𝑔). Since the optimal labor contract is affected
by the goal (𝑔) we refer to the optimal fixed pay for a given goal as 𝛼𝑔∗ and the optimal
performance pay for a given goal as 𝛽𝑔∗ .

2

This specification was also used in theoretical works such as Wu et al. (2008) who studied workers’ response to
exogenously given goals in the absence of monetary incentives.
3
Similar findings hold when considering the case in which principals induce only one type of agent to exert effort.
Further details are available upon request from the authors.
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Proposition 1 (Optimal contract with goal setting)
The optimal contract for a given goal is such that:
𝜋

𝛼𝑔∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐 ∆𝜋0 − 𝜋1 (∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ) − 𝑣0𝑔 , 0}
𝛽𝑔∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {

1
𝑐
[ − Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ] , 0}
y𝐻 − y𝐿 Δ𝜋

And the optimal goal is such that:
𝑔∗ ∈ (0, 𝑦𝐻 )
The principal uses performance pay to reward the agent when output is high. Performance
pay (𝛽𝑔∗ ) increases with the cost of effort and decreases with Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 that represents the agent’s
goal-dependent utility of achieving a high output relative to a low output. Note that if this goaldependent non-monetary payoff is sufficiently high with respect to the cost of effort the principal
will not need to provide any monetary incentives (𝛽𝑔∗ = 0) to motivate the agent. The fixed pay
(𝛼𝑔∗ ) is set so that the agent accepts the labor contract. Finally, the optimal goal (𝑔∗ ) is positive
and always attainable by the high-ability agent.
In the following corollary we study the relationship between fixed pay, performance pay and
goals in the optimal labor contract.
Corollary 1 (Monetary incentives and goals)
∗
𝑑𝛼𝑔

𝑑𝑔

𝑑𝛽𝑔∗

≥0;

𝑑𝑔

≤0

Corollary 1 captures an important effect of wage-irrelevant goals on the compensation
contract. It shows that an increase in the goal set by the principal leads to an increase in fixed pay
and a decrease in performance pay. In other words, goal setting makes the optimal contract less
sensitive to changes in performance.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 follows from the fact that goals provide non-monetary
incentives that can be used to substitute monetary incentives thus dampening the weight of
performance pay in the labor contract. By setting appropriate goals which are less likely to be
attained with low effort the principal can increase the non-monetary costs of shirking. Doing so,
the principal will be able to decrease performance pay while still motivating the agent to work.
Technically, the principal can choose goals that maximize Δ𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 thus making the agent’s
incentive compatibility constraint slacker so that performance pay can be lowered while still
motivating the agent to exert effort. However, using goals to motivate the agent comes at a cost.
7

As principals set more challenging goals the agent is more likely to fall short of the goal and
experience a non-monetary loss. It follows that principals who set challenging goals will have to
raise fixed pay to ensure the participation of the agent. In sum, goal setting generates a tradeoff
between lowering performance-based incentives and increasing fixed pay to ensure agents’
participation.
Corollary 1 sheds light on previous empirical evidence regarding the relative weakness of
incentives in real-world labor contracts (see Chiappori and Salanié 2000). In particular, we show
that taking into account non-monetary incentives such as goal setting may be key to understand
the limited use of monetary incentives in actual labor contracts.
An essential feature of the optimal contract is that the decrease in performance pay (monetary
incentives) made possible by the use of wage-irrelevant goals (non-monetary incentives) more
than compensates the necessary increase in fixed pay. This leads to a decrease in the principal’s
agency costs of motivating agents without decreasing the (monetary and non-monetary)
incentives of the agent to exert effort. It follows that agents will exert more effort and principals
will obtain higher earnings when goal setting is possible than when it is not (𝑔 = 0). We
summarize these findings in our second corollary.
Corollary 2 (Goal setting minimizes agency costs) Goal setting allows the principal to induce
agents to exert high effort with a lower wage bill.
The main implications of our model will be tested in a controlled workplace environment
which is described in the next section.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & CONJECTURES
3.1. Virtual Workplace with Real Effort and Real Leisure
We develop a framework in which subjects can undertake a real-effort task while having
access to a real-leisure alternative (browsing the Internet) at any point in time during the
experiment. The idea is to consider a laboratory environment in which on-the-job shirking is
commonly observed so as to be able to uncover incentives effects (Corgnet et al. 2015d). The
laboratory setting allows the experimenter to control for possible confounding factors commonly
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encountered in the field such as organizational hierarchies or implicit incentives thus facilitating
the detection of incentives effects.4
3.1.1. Organizational Roles
We consider two types of subjects referred to as B (agent) and C (principal). At the beginning
of each of the 6 periods, subjects were randomly assigned to one of these two roles. As a result,
subjects could either be an agent or a principal depending on the period. 5 Each agent was
randomly matched with a single principal. During a period, agents could dedicate their time to
either completing the work task or browsing the web while principals could only browse the
Internet.
3.1.2. The Work Task
We consider a real-effort summation task that is particularly long, laborious and effortful
(e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Eriksson et al. 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Subjects
would sum up matrices of 36 numbers comprised between 0 and 3 for one hour, divided into 10minute periods. Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20
cents was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer. 6 We define
production as the monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers on the work task.
Subjects were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This rule amplified the
level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables correctly. An example of the work
task is shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1.- Example of table summation for the work task.

4

In our lab setting, agents only face explicit incentives.
In a similar environment, Corgnet et al. (2015a) find that fixing subjects’ roles for the whole experiment instead of
randomizing roles each period does not significantly affect behavior.
6
Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be
negative.
5
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3.1.3. Internet Browsing
At any point during the experiment, agents could switch from the work task to the leisure
activity that consisted of browsing the Internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a
different screen so that subjects could not sum tables while being on the Internet. Subjects were
informed that their use of the Internet was strictly confidential. Subjects were free to consult their
email or visit any web page. 7 The Internet browser was embedded in the software so that the
experimenter could keep record of the exact amount of time subjects spent on each activity. 8
3.1.4. Contracts
At the beginning of each period, principals received an initial endowment of 200 cents. Then,
principals proposed a linear contract (𝛼, 𝛽) to the agent by offering a non-negative fixed pay,
𝛼 ∈ [0,200], as well as a performance pay, 𝛽 ∈ [0,1], representing the share of the work output
assigned to the agent. In line with the limited liability assumption in our theoretical framework,
the principal could not “sell the firm” to the agent by proposing a negative fixed pay.
In addition to setting monetary incentives principals could set a goal to the agent (in the goal
setting treatment). The goal was stated in terms of the production (in cents) of the agent. We
informed participants that producing more or less than the goal neither generated rewards nor
induced penalties to the agent. The principal could decide not to set a goal in which case the
label “no goal” would appear on the screen.
After receiving the principal’s offer (fixed pay, performance pay and production goal), the
agent had to decide whether to accept it or to reject it. In case of acceptance, the agent would be
rewarded according to the agreed-upon contract. The agent would then be able to work on the
task or browse the Internet for leisure purposes. In case of rejection, the agent would only be able
to browse the web for a fixed payment of 150¢ and the principal would keep his or her initial
endowment of 200¢. The earnings for the agent and the principal are described in Table 1.

7

Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet on campus.
The lab policy is to forbid cell phone use inside the lab. This ensures that embedded internet browsing is an
accurate measure of on-the-job leisure.
8
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TABLE 1. Agents’ and principals’ earnings per period (in cents).
Agents’ decision

Agents’ earnings

Principals’ earnings

Offer accepted

𝛼 + 𝛽(Agent production)

(200 − 𝛼) + (1 − 𝛽)(Agent production)

Offer rejected
150
200
(𝛼, 𝛽) represents the principal’s offer, where 𝛼 ∈ [0,200] and 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]
3.2. Treatments and Procedures
We conducted two treatments (see Table 2). In the baseline treatment, principals offered a
linear contract (fixed pay and performance pay) to the agent. In the goal setting treatment
principals could set a wage-irrelevant goal to the agent in addition to monetary incentives.
TABLE 2. Summary of the treatments.
Treatment

Description

Number of participants
(observations) [sessions]

Baseline

Principals propose a linear contract to the agent.

54 (162) [5]

Goal Setting

Principals propose a linear contract and a wageirrelevant goal to the agent.

56 (168) [5]

Our subject pool consisted of students from a major U.S. University. We recruited people
who previously participated in related studies (Corgnet and Hernan-Gonzalez, 2015; Corgnet et
al. 2015c) so as to ensure that they had experience in completing the work task used in this
experiment. This was done so that subjects could accurately assess their skills on the task and
better understand the consequences of each possible contract. We conducted a total of 10
sessions with ten or twelve subjects each for a total of 110 subjects (54 were assigned to the
baseline and 56 were assigned to the goal setting treatment).9
The experiment was computerized and all of the interaction was anonymous. The instructions
were displayed on subjects’ computer screens (see Appendix B). Subjects had exactly 20 minutes
to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen. Three minutes
before the end of the instructions period, a monitor announced the time remaining and handed
out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the subjects asked for extra time
to read the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the instructions file was
closed, and the experiment started. The interaction between the experimenter and the subjects
was negligible.
9

Out of the ten sessions, five were conducted with ten people and five were conducted with twelve.
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At the end of the experiment and before payments were made, we elicited subjects social
preferences (see online Appendix O.1) and asked them to report their math skills on a scale from
1 to 7. These questionnaires lasted ten minutes.
Subjects were paid their earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. Individual earnings
were computed as the sum of the earnings in the 6 periods. Subjects earned on average $31.6 in
addition to a $7 show-up fee. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours.
3.3. Testable Conjectures
The aim of our experiment is not to test the point predictions derived from the model
introduced in Section 2. Instead, we aim at assessing the main implications of our theoretical
framework regarding the relation between monetary incentives (𝛼, 𝛽) and non-monetary
incentives (𝑔). Based on our previous analysis, we state two conjectures that can be readily
tested. Our first hypothesis states how goal setting affects the optimal labor contract.
Hypothesis 1: Goal Setting and Labor Contracts [based on Corollary 1]
We expect fixed pay to be greater and performance pay to be lower in the presence of
goal setting than in its absence.
Note that Hypothesis 1 is a particular case of Corollary 1, which shows that higher goals
increase fixed pay while decreasing performance pay. In our experiment we will consider two
treatments: one in which goal setting is made available to the principal and one in which it is not
(baseline). Therefore, we expect weaker monetary incentives with goal setting (𝑔∗ > 0) than in
its absence (𝑔 = 0).
According to Corollary 2, the agency costs of inducing high effort are lower if the principal
can combine monetary incentives with goal setting. Thus, we expect effort and production to be,
on average, higher under goal setting than in the baseline. From Corollary 2 we also expect that
the cost of inducing effort decreases with goal setting which will lead principals to earn
significantly more in the presence of goal setting than in its absence. We thus derive the
following hypothesis.

12

Hypothesis 2: Production, Effort and Principals’ Earnings [based on Corollary 2]
i) We expect production levels and work effort to be greater in the presence of goal
setting than in its absence.
ii) We also expect principals’ earnings to be greater in the presence of goal setting
than in its absence.

4. RESULTS
We start the results section by comparing principals’ offers across treatments. We then study
contract acceptance, effort and production levels. In our analysis, we use linear and probit panel
regressions with random effects and robust standard errors.10
4.1. Contract Design (Hypothesis 1)
Contracts are largely consistent with Hypothesis 1 according to which principals should offer
weaker incentives when goal setting is present than when it is absent (see Table 3). For example,
considering accepted offers, performance pay was lower in the presence of goal setting, 41.5%,
that in its absence, 45.1%, while fixed pay was larger in the goal setting treatment, 104.9¢, than
in the baseline, 98.7¢. These differences are statistically significant as is shown in Table 3 where
we report the p-value associated to the Goal Setting Dummy (which takes value 1 if a subject was
involved in the goal setting treatment, and 0 otherwise) when conducting panel regressions using
either fixed pay or performance pay as dependent variable. For the sake of completeness, we
report the results of regressions using both accepted offers as well as all offers. However, it
should be noted that considering all offers may not be an adequate test of our theoretical
conjectures as rejected offers include null offers (𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0) that may bias the analysis.11

10

Results are robust to using other specifications such as Tobit models, non-robust standard errors and wild cluster
bootstrap standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2011) as well as OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at
the session level. These additional analyses are available upon request from the authors.
11
If we remove extremely low offers from all principals’ offers, the difference in performance pay across treatments
becomes significant in that case as well. For example, if we remove all those offers for which fixed pay is zero cent
and performance pay is 0% [less than 5%] (n=3) [n=8] the corresponding p-value becomes 0.092 [0.029].
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Average
(Standard dev.)
Accepted offers

All offers

†

TABLE 3. Principals’ offers across treatments.
Goal Setting
Baseline
Treatment
Fixed pay
98.7¢
104.9¢
(28.7¢)
(31.0¢)
Performance
45.1%
41.5%
pay
(13.3%)
(10.4%)
[n=123]
[n=138]
Fixed pay
90.3¢
100.3¢
(34.9¢)
(33.3¢)
Performance
42.5%
40.4%
pay
(16.9%)
(11.3%)
[n=162]
[n=168]

Goal Setting Dummy
P-value†
0.077
0.011

0.003
0.150

In this column we report the results of two linear panel regressions with robust standard errors with fixed pay and
performance pay as dependent variables, and a Goal Setting Dummy (which takes value 1 if a subject was involved in
the goal setting treatment and value 0 otherwise) as regressor. In particular, we report the p-value associated to the
coefficient of the Goal Setting Dummy.

It is also worth noting that, in the great majority of the cases (84.5%, 142/168), principals set
a goal to the agent.12 Principals set an average goal of 306.7¢ (SD = 118.2¢) (see Histogram C1
in Appendix C).
4.2. Contract Acceptance
The large majority of offers were accepted by agents in both the baseline (75.9%, 123/162)
and the goal setting treatment (82.1%, 138/168). In our regression analysis (Table 4), we use as
dependent variable a dummy (Accepted dummy) that takes value 1 if a given offer is accepted
and takes value 0 otherwise. We use self-reported math skills as a control for subjects’ ability. 13
Not surprisingly, agents are more likely to accept the principal’s offer when the fixed pay and the
performance pay assigned to the agent are high. The treatment variable is never significant,
except in the case in which we do not control for fixed pay (p-value = 0.05). However, this

12

If we consider as setting “no goals” instances in which production goals were set either at very low or at very high
levels (such as the following five cases in: 2¢, 2¢, 3¢, 10,000¢, and 1,000,000,000¢), then principals set goals in
81.6% of the cases.
13
Our results are robust to introducing other measures of ability. For example, we can measure ability using a
dummy variable which takes value 1 if a subject has completed his or her first table correctly and value 0 otherwise.
Previous research has shown a positive and significant relationship between first table performance and ability on
the task (Corgnet et al. 2015b). Considering a continuous measure such as the amount of time necessary to complete
the first table correctly also gives similar results.
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significance may be reflecting treatment differences in fixed pay as the effect disappears when
we control for only fixed pay or both, fixed pay and performance pay. 14
TABLE 4. Probit panel regressions for contract acceptance (Accepted Dummy).
Constant
-0.90**
-0.62
-3.68***
(0.39)
(0.45)
(0.78)
Goal Setting Dummy
0.12
0.31*
0.14
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.19)
Contract offer
Fixed pay
0.02***
0.02***
(0.002)
(0.004)
Performance pay
0.02***
0.04***
(0.01)
(0.01)
Math skills
0.06
0.07
0.12
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
Number of observations
324
324
324
χ²
38.53***
22.23***
38.09
***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.

4.3. Effort and Production (Hypothesis 2i)
In the goal setting treatment, agents produced on average 26.7% more than in the baseline
despite receiving significantly lower performance pay (see Figure 2). The difference in
production across treatments corresponds to a difference in subjects’ hourly production of $5.2.
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2i.
$4.5

Production

Share of production
$4.1

45.1%

$4.0

46%
45%
44%

$3.5

$3.2

43%

$3.0
42%
$2.5

41.5%

$2.0

41%
40%

Baseline
Goal Setting
FIGURE 2.- Agents’ average production (in US Dollars) and performance
pay (for accepted offers) across treatments.
14

The treatment variable is not significant (p-value = 0.11) when we include neither fixed pay nor performance pay
as controls.
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We confirm the statistical significance of these differences in Table 5. We find that the Goal
Setting Dummy is significant whether controlling for fixed pay, performance pay or both. Fixed
pay does not explain production levels in contrast with gift-exchange experiments in which the
contract designed by the principal only includes fixed pay (e.g. Fehr et al. 1993). However,
performance pay relates positively to agents’ production, which stresses that, in line with our
theoretical framework, monetary incentives continue to be relevant even in the presence of goal
setting.
TABLE 5. Linear panel regressions for Production (in US Dollars).
Constant
Goal Setting Dummy
Contract offer
Fixed pay
Performance pay
Math skills
Number of observations
R²
χ²

160.35**
(74.46)
93.16***
(28.81)

56.83
(74.01)
96.13***
(28.54)

-0.17
(0.21)

-

33.33**
(13.43)
258
0.14
20.28***

1.74***
(0.61)
35.32***
(13.25)
258
0.16
25.54***

37.94
(82.82)
95.66***
(28.57)
0.12
(0.21)
1.87***
(0.62)
35.47***
(13.32)
258
0.16
25.89***

*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

In addition to the increase in production levels, goal setting led to an increase in agents’ effort
(see Table 6). We assessed effort by computing the number of tables agents completed as well as
the time agents spent working instead of browsing the web. In the goal setting treatment agents
completed 27.6% more tables than in the baseline and spent substantially less time browsing the
web (4.0%) than in the baseline (11.2%). This implies that agents spent close to six minutes less
per hour browsing the web in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline. These differences
are statistically significant, as is shown in Table C1 in Appendix C. The increase in agents’
production in the goal setting treatment follows not only from an increase in the time agents
spent working but also from higher productivity levels. To show that, we define productivity as
the production (in US Dollars) of an agent per minute spent on the task screen. In Table 6, we
show that productivity was 23.5% higher in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline, and
this difference is statistically significant (see Table C1 in Appendix C).
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TABLE 6. Effort and productivity across treatments.
Average
(standard deviation)
Internet use (%)
Completed tables
Productivity

Baseline

Goal Setting

11.20%
(25.29%)
9.76
(4.80)
$0.34
($0.16)

3.99%
(15.25%)
12.45
(3.84)
$0.42
($0.15)

In Table C1 in Appendix C, we show that performance pay as well as math skills led agents
to complete more tables and be more productive. However, performance pay and math skills did
not affect the time agents spent on the work task. The presence of goal setting is the only
variable that led agents to spend more time working and less time browsing. These findings seem
to indicate that the use of goals may help agents perceive the task as more enjoyable leading
them to reduce their leisure time on the job. This behavior is in line with our theoretical
framework which assumes that setting goals to agents will generate non-monetary utility.
4.4. Agency Costs and Principals’ Earnings (Hypothesis 2ii)
The higher level of production in the goal setting treatment than in the baseline led principals
to earn significantly more under goal setting. The average hourly earnings for principals were
17.3% higher in the goal setting treatment, $19.7, compared to the baseline, $16.8 (see Table 7).
This result confirms Hypothesis 2ii according to which principals can complement monetary
incentives with non-monetary incentives to reduce agency costs.
Interestingly, agents’ earnings were also higher in the goal setting treatment than in the
baseline despite lower performance pay when goals were present (see last column in Table 7).
This was the case because fixed pay as well as production were significantly higher in the goal
setting treatment than in the baseline.

17

Constant
Goal Setting Dummy
Performance pay15

TABLE 7. Linear panel regressions for earnings.
Principal earnings Principal earnings
All offers
Accepted offers
258.30***
276.44***
(8.04)
(9.85)
51.29***
57.55***
(10.97)
(12.72)

Math skills
Number of observations
R²
χ²

-

-

-

-

330
0.06
21.87***

261
0.07
20.47***

Agent Earnings
Accepted offers
23.48
(39.47)
42.51***
(13.41)
3.28***
(0.47)
14.52**
(6.06)
258
0.25
57.45***

*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

An important implication of our findings is that weaker monetary incentives are not
necessarily associated with lower monetary earnings for both agents and principals. Goal setting
allows principals to boost work performance and profits while still paying more money to the
agents.
4.5. Robustness Checks
In Appendix O.1, we show the robustness of all our findings when controlling for otherregarding preferences in addition to math skills. Social preferences have indeed been shown to be
relevant in experimental tests of the principal-agent theory. In particular, subjects’ decision to
accept or reject a contract as well their decision to produce may be affected by other-regarding
preferences (Keser and Willinger, 2000, 2007; Anderhub et al. 2002). Also, Cabrales et al.
(2010) have shown that agents are more likely to select contract offers from principals who have
social preferences which are similar to their own.16
In Appendix O.2, we turn to the analysis of the effect of individual goals in the goal setting
treatment. Our objective is to check the soundness of our theoretical framework by showing that
more challenging goals, whenever attainable, lead agents to increase their production. We also
show that goal setting reduces the dispersion in production levels which tends to cluster around
the goal. These findings are in line with standard goal setting models (e.g. Wu et al. 2008).
15

We do not show the regression results that control for fixed pay as the coefficient associated to fixed pay is never
statistically significant. This also helps avoid collinearity issues which could be induced by using both fixed pay and
performance pay as controls in the regression. Our results continue to hold when controlling either for fixed pay or
for both fixed pay and performance pay.
16
This finding has important implications for organizational research potentially accounting for the observed
heterogeneity in “corporate cultures” across firms.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Using both agency models and experiments, we have shown that principals set weaker
monetary incentives when they can set wage-irrelevant goals than when they cannot. This is the
case because principals can reduce agency costs by substituting costly monetary incentives with
non-monetary incentives. Despite weaker monetary incentives, agents work more in the presence
of goal setting than in its absence generating higher earnings for principals.
Our findings contribute to the theory of incentives by showing that non-monetary incentives
can remain effective even when monetary incentives are widely available. It follows that nonmonetary incentives are not second-best solutions that only gain popularity when monetary
incentives are costly to implement. Our findings suggest that both monetary and non-monetary
incentives effectively motivate people. This highlights the importance of studying different types
of incentives jointly so as to provide effective guidance to practitioners.
Finally, our analysis constitutes a point of departure for a theory of the firm that uses nonmonetary incentives as a building block to explain why firms consistently rely on weak incentive
schemes. To that end, one could extend our work by analyzing the interaction between monetary
and non-monetary incentives in larger and more complex organizations involving, for example,
multiple-layer hierarchies.
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APPENDIX A: Theoretical Framework
The principal’s problem is to maximize profits subject to participation and incentives
compatibility constrains of each agent type. For the sake of illustration, we assume that ∆𝑦: =
𝑦𝐻 – 𝑦𝐿 = 𝑦𝐿 > 0. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis but is not key for our results.
If both types of agents, l and h, exert a positive effort, the expected production is given by
E(𝑦) = 𝜃 (π1 𝑦H + (1 − π1 )𝑦L ) + (1 − 𝜃 )π1𝑦L = Δ𝑦(𝜃 + 𝜋1 ) and the expected compensation is
given by E(w) = 𝜃(π1 wH + (1 − π1 )wL ) + (1 − 𝜃 )(π1 wL + (1 − π1 )𝛼 ) = 𝛽𝐸 (𝑦) + 𝛼 where
w𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐻 and w𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐿 . Principal’s profits are given by 𝐸(𝑦) − 𝐸 (w) =
(1 − 𝛽)𝐸 (𝑦) − 𝛼.
The high-ability agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICh) is given by:
𝜋1 [wH + 𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋1 )[wL + 𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)]– 𝑐
≥ 𝜋0 [wH + 𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋0 )[wL + 𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)]
and the low ability agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICl) is given by:
𝜋1 [wL + 𝑣 (yL − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋1 )[α + 𝑣(−𝑔)]– 𝑐
≥ 𝜋0 [wL + 𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋0 )[α + 𝑣(−𝑔)]
Thus, if (ICi) is satisfied, agent 𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} prefers to exert a positive effort.
By normalizing to zero the agent’s reservation utility we can define the high-ability agent’s
participation constraint (PCh) as:
𝜋1 [wH + 𝑣(𝑦H − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋1 )[wL + 𝑣(𝑦L − 𝑔)]– 𝑐 ≥ 0
and the low-ability agent’s participation constraint (PCl) as:
𝜋1 [wL + 𝑣(yL − 𝑔)] + (1 − 𝜋1 )[α + 𝑣 (−𝑔)]– 𝑐 ≥ 0
If (PCi) is satisfied, agent i is willing to sign the contract with the principal.
Rearranging terms we can rewrite the incentive compatibility and participation constraints as:
∆𝜋[𝛽(𝑦𝐻 − 𝑦𝐿 ) + ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ] ≥ 𝑐

(ICh)
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∆𝜋[𝛽𝑦𝐿 + ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔] ≥ 𝑐

(ICl)

𝛼 + 𝜋1 [𝛽𝑦𝐻 + 𝑣𝐻,𝑔 ] + (1 − 𝜋1)[𝛽𝑦𝐿 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔 ] ≥ 𝑐

(PCh)

𝛼 + 𝜋1 [𝛽𝑦𝐿 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔 ] + (1 − 𝜋1 )𝑣0,𝑔 ≥ 𝑐

(PCl)

A feasible contract is a pair of wages and a goal {α, β, g} that induce positive effort ensuring
agent’s participation. The optimal contract is the solution of the following problem:
max (1 − 𝛽)𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛼

(P1)

{α,β,g}

subject to (ICh, ICl, PCh, PCl)
∎
Proof of Proposition 1
The principal problem (P1) consists in motivating agent’s effort at the lowest monetary cost
using a linear contract and a wage-irrelevant goal.
Since PCL implies PCH in equilibrium:
𝛼𝑔 = max{𝑐 − 𝜋1 [𝛽𝑔 ∆𝑦 + 𝑣𝐿,𝑔 ] − (1 − 𝜋1)𝑣0,𝑔 , 0}.

(A1)

Depending on model parameters we have:
a.

∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 > ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 so ICl implies ICh.

b.

∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ≤ ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 so ICh implies ICl.

Therefore, in case (a) we have that:
𝛽𝑔∗ = max {

1

[

𝑐

∆𝑦 ∆𝜋

− ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 ] , 0}

(A2)

and by plugging (A2) in (A1) we get:
𝛼𝑔∗ = max {−

𝑐𝜋0
∆𝜋

− 𝑣0,𝑔 , 0},

Note that for any α𝑔 > 0,
0 iff y>g and

𝑑2 𝑣(𝑦−𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑦

𝑑α𝑔
𝑑𝑔

(A3)
> 0. Moreover, by the properties of 𝑣(∙) we know that

< 0 iff y<g. Therefore,

𝑑∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔
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𝑑𝑔

< 0 and hence

𝑑β𝑔
𝑑𝑔

𝑑2 𝑣(𝑦−𝑔)
𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑦

>

> 0 for any 𝛽𝑔 > 0.

This implies that case (a) cannot arise in equilibrium with positive goals, because the principal
could decrease both α𝑔 and βg by setting a lower goal.
Therefore, only case (b) can emerge in equilibrium. In this case,
𝛽𝑔∗ = max {

1

[

𝑐

∆𝑦 ∆𝜋

− ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ] , 0}

(A4)

Moreover, by plugging (A4) in (A1) we get:
𝜋

𝛼𝑔∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐 ∆𝜋0 − 𝜋1 (∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ) − 𝑣0𝑔 , 0}

(A5)

Finally, the principal will set the goal that maximizes profits. Thus, the optimal goal is given by
(P2)

𝑔∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑔 (1 − 𝛽𝑔∗ )𝐸(𝑦) − 𝛼𝑔∗ = argmin𝑔 𝛼𝑔∗ + 𝛽𝑔∗ 𝐸 (𝑦)

It remains to be proved that 𝑔∗ ∈ (0, 𝑦𝐻 )
We first prove that 𝑔∗ > 0. Let’s assume by contradiction that 𝑔∗ = 0. In this case,
1 𝑐
𝛽0∗ = max { [ − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,0 ] , 0}
∆𝑦 ∆𝜋
𝜋

And 𝛼0∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐 ∆𝜋0 − 𝜋1(∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ), 0} = 0
Let’s consider a goal 𝑔 = 𝜀, where 𝜀 > 0 is sufficiently small so that 𝛼𝜀 =0. In this case,
1 𝑐
𝛽𝜀∗ = max { [ − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝜀 ] , 0}
∆𝑦 ∆𝜋
Since, by property (v) of 𝑣(∙) we know that ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,0 < ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝜀 , this implies that for any positive
performance pay, 𝛽𝜀∗ < 𝛽0∗ , and hence 𝑔 yields greater profits than 𝑔∗ = 0.
To prove that 𝑔∗ < 𝑦𝐻 note that if 𝑔 ≥ 𝑦𝐻 then ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 < ∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 and as we proved above (case
a) the principal would be better off setting a lower goal.
∎
Proof of Corollary 1
By property (iii) of 𝑣(∙) we know that 𝑣0𝑔 = −𝜆𝑣(𝑔). Therefore, we can rewrite equation (A5)
as
𝛼𝑔∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {−𝑐

𝜋0
− 𝜋1 (∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 − ∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 ) + 𝜆𝑣(𝑔),0}
∆𝜋
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𝛼𝑔∗

Therefore,

𝜋
−𝑐 0 −𝜋1 (∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 −∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 )
∆𝜋

> 0 iff 𝜆 >

𝑣(𝑔)

> 0. Note also that given that 𝑔∗ > 0 there is

always a sufficiently high 𝜆 so that 𝛼𝑔∗ ∗ > 0.
If 𝛼𝑔∗ > 0, the optimal goal is the solution of the problem (P2). The first order condition of this
problem is:
−

𝑑𝛽𝑔∗
𝑑𝑔

𝐸 (𝑦 ) −

Therefore,

∗
𝑑𝛼𝑔

𝑑𝑔

𝑑𝛽𝑔∗

=0

and

𝑑𝑔

∗
𝑑𝛼𝑔

𝑑𝑔

(A6)
must have opposite signs.

Deriving both sides of equation (A1) with respect to g, we get that:
−

∗
𝑑𝛼𝑔

𝑑𝑔

𝑑𝛽𝑔∗

= −𝜋1 [ 𝑑𝑔 𝑦𝐿 +

𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑔

] − (1 − 𝜋1 )

𝑑𝑣0,𝑔

(A7)

𝑑𝑔

Thus, by plugging equation (A7) in equation (A6) we get:
𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑣0,𝑔
𝑑𝛽𝑔∗ 𝜋1 𝑑𝑔 + (1 − 𝜋1 ) 𝑑𝑔
=
𝑑𝑔
𝐸 [𝑦] − 𝜋1 𝑦𝐿
Note that since

𝑑𝑣𝐿,𝑔
𝑑𝑔

and

𝑑𝑣0,𝑔
𝑑𝑔

are both negative (see properties of function 𝑣(∙) in the main text),

the numerator of this expression is negative. Moreover, since E(y) = 𝜃 (π1 𝑦H + (1 − π1 )𝑦L ) +
(1 − 𝜃 )π1yL , the denominator is positive for any 𝜃 > 0. Therefore,
(A6),

∗
𝑑𝛼𝑔

𝑑𝑔

𝑑𝛽𝑔∗
𝑑𝑔

< 0 and by equation

> 0.

Finally, it is possible that

𝛼𝑔∗

= 0, if 𝜆 ≤

𝜋
−𝑐 0−𝜋1 (∆𝑣𝐿0,𝑔 −∆𝑣𝐻𝐿,𝑔 )
∆𝜋

𝑣(𝑔)

𝑐

, and/or 𝛽𝑔∗ = 0, if ∆v𝐻𝐿,𝑔 > ∆𝜋 ,

so the result follows.
∎
Proof of Corollary 2
It follows directly from Proposition 1.
∎
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APPENDIX B: Instructions

Click here
Link: https://goo.gl/Smg9M8
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APPENDIX C
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FIGURE C1.- Histogram of goals set by principals (in cents).

TABLE C1. Linear panel regressions for effort and productivity.
Constant
Goal Setting Dummy
Performance pay
Math skills
Number of observations
R²
χ²

Internet use (%)
13.59*
(7.41)
-9.37**
(4.06)
-0.09
(0.09)
0.78
(1.28)
258
0.04
6.29*

Tables completed
3.75**
(1.76)
3.18***
(0.76)
0.04***
(0.02)
0.72**
(0.31)
258
0.16
29.53***

Productivity
0.08
(0.07)
0.08***
(0.03)
0.001***
(0.001)
0.04***
(0.01)
254
0.18
27.85***

*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX O.1 (For Online Publication)
Social preferences
We elicited social preferences à la Bartling et al. (2009) by asking subjects to make four
choices between two possible allocations of money between themselves and another anonymous
subject with whom they were randomly matched. The allocation decisions are described in Table
O1. Option A always yielded an even distribution of money ($2 to the self and the other subject).
Option B yielded uneven payoffs: ($2, $1), (3$, $1), (2$, $4), and (3$, $5) in Games 1, 2, 3 and
4, respectively. We classify subjects following Bartling et al. (2009) into four social preferences
categories as is described in the last column of the table. Prosocial types prefer equal
distributions of income even when they have the possibility to earn more than the other subjects,
as is the case in Game 2. Envy types dislike earning less than the other subject and choose
Option A in the last two games even if it implies a lower payoff to themselves (Game 4).
Following the authors, we finally characterize subjects as either ahead (behind) averse if they
were both prosocial and costly prosocial (envious and costly envious). Egalitarian subjects are
defined as being both ahead and behind averse.
TABLE O1. Social preferences elicitation (Bartling et al. 2009).
Game

Option A
Payoff self, Payoff other

Option B

Social preferences

Payoff self, Payoff

type if choice is

other

Option A

1

$2,$2

$2,$1

Prosociality

2

$2,$2

$3,$1

Costly Prosociality

3

$2,$2

$2,$4

Envy

4

$2,$2

$3,$5

Costly Envy

In Tables D1, D2, D3 and D4 we replicate the results reported in Tables 4, 5, C1 and 7,
respectively, controlling for subjects’ social preferences.
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TABLE O2. Probit panel regressions for the Accepted Dummy
controlling for social preferences.
-0.89**
-0.75
Constant
(0.40)
(0.47)
0.08
0.35**
Goal Setting Dummy
(0.19)
(0.16)
Contract offer
0.02***
Fixed pay
(0.003)
0.03***
Performance pay
(0.01)
0.06
0.06
Math skills
(0.06)
(0.06)
Social preferences
0.47
0.30
Ahead averse
(0.29)
(0.36)
-0.03
0.21
Behind averse
(0.19)
(0.16)
Number of observations
324
324
χ²
38.98***
23.68***

-3.67***
(0.76)
0.13
(0.19)
0.02***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)
0.11
(0.07)
0.43
(0.27)
0.05
(0.19)
324
38.36***

***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE O3. Linear panel regressions for Production (in US Dollars)
controlling for social preferences.
149.40**
43.96
25.70
Constant
(73.14)
(73.26)
(82.88)
97.99***
101.43***
100.92***
Goal Setting Dummy
(30.71)
(30.47)
(30.52)
Contract offer
-0.18
0.12
Fixed pay
(0.22)
(0.21)
1.74***
1.87***
Performance pay
(0.62)
(0.62)
32.96**
35.00**
35.20**
Math skills
(14.05)
(13.82)
(13.91)
Social preferences
-1.57
-4.36
-5.76
Ahead averse
(42.71)
(42.77)
(43.72)
17.60
19.08
18.68
Behind averse
(32.43)
(32.12)
(32.15)
Number of observations
258
258
258
χ²
21.86***
26.53***
26.67***
***Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE O4. Linear panel regressions for effort and productivity
controlling for social preferences.
Internet use (%) Tables completed
Productivity
Constant
15.01*
3.32*
0.06
(8.37)
(1.80)
(0.07)
Goal Setting Dummy
-9.99**
3.36***
0.09***
(4.68)
(0.83)
(0.03)
Contract offer
Performance pay
-0.09
0.04***
0.002***
(0.09)
(0.02)
(0.001)
Math skills
1.09
0.72**
0.04***
(1.34)
(0.33)
(0.01)
Social preferences
Ahead averse
-8.92***
-0.50
-0.02
(2.94)
(0.96)
(0.04)
Behind averse
-3.46
0.59
0.02
(4.77)
(0.87)
(0.03)
Number of observations
258
258
254
R²
0.05
0.16
0.18
χ²
13.30**
29.29***
29.58***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE O5. Linear panel regressions for earnings controlling for social preferences.
Principal earnings Principal earnings Agent Earnings
All offers
Accepted offers
Accepted offers
Constant
255.44***
270.50***
15.02
(12.31)
(15.09)
(39.18)
Goal Setting Dummy
52.57***
59.03***
45.98***
(11.41)
(13.62)
(14.07)
Contract offer
Performance pay
3.29***
(0.47)
Ability measures
Self-reported skills
14.03**
(6.26)
Social preferences
Ahead averse
-12.98
8.08
7.61
(20.32)
(23.75)
(17.23)
Behind averse
4.87
8.08
13.65
(11.88)
(13.86)
(14.93)
Number of observations
330
261
258
R²
0.06
0.07
0.26
χ²
21.87***
20.58***
61.38***
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX O.2 (For Online Publication)
On the internal mechanics of the goal setting model
O.2.1. On the positive effect of challenging but attainable goals
After assessing the aggregate effect of goals in previous sections, we turn to the analysis of the
effect of individual goals in the goal setting treatment. Our objective is to deepen our
understanding of the effect of goals and connect our findings to our theoretical framework. This
section thus tests the internal mechanics of our model instead of its main conjectures. To
understand the effect of individual goals, we need to identify those goals which were reasonably
accurate in the sense of being attainable by agents of a given ability level. To that end, we start
by building a measure of ability on the task to predict the production level a given participant
should be able to complete correctly in the work task. We denote this predictor of performance
by work task ability. This variable is constructed for each participant 𝑖 as follows:
Work task abilityi = α
̂0 + α
̂1 × (Self˗reported) Math skills𝑖
+α
̂2 × First table correct 𝑖 + α
̂3 First correct table time𝑖

where First table correcti is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if subject i completed correctly
the first attempted table, First correct table timei measures the time subject i spent to complete
the first correct table, and the coefficients α
̂ 0, α
̂1 , α
̂2 and α
̂3 are estimated with the following
linear panel regression using data from the baseline treatment:
Number of correct tables𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1 × (Self˗reported) Math skills𝑖
+α2 × First table correct 𝑖 + α3 First correct table time𝑖 + ϵ𝑖𝑡

We obtain α
̂ 0 = 253.61 (114.59), α
̂ 1 = 27.92 (17.22), ̂α 2 = 93.97 (49.96) and α
̂3 = −1.72
(0.54) (robust standard errors in brackets), for a regression with R2 = 0.27. The difference
between agents’ production levels in the baseline and their estimated work task ability was less
than the value of one (two) [three] correct tables in 28.5% (42.3%) [62.4%] of the cases.
We define reasonably and non-reasonably accurate goals on the basis of work task ability.
Reasonably (non-reasonably) accurate goals are defined such that the difference -in absolute
terms- between the goal set by the principal and the estimated work task ability of the agent is
less (more) than the value of two tables. Using this criterion, 29.7% of the goals in the goal
setting treatment are classified as reasonably accurate. We also report similar results using either
a wider (+/-3 tables, 46.4% of reasonably accurate goals) or a narrower range (+/- 1 table, 13.8%
of reasonably accurate goals) for the definition of reasonably accurate goals. The difference
between an agent’s maximum and minimum levels of production in the baseline treatment was
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on average equal to 3.3 tables indicating that, on average, a goal which is within +/-2 or +/-3
tables of work task ability is likely to correspond to a normal range of values of production for a
given participant. We show that the interaction term between the value of the goal and the
reasonable goal dummy is positive and significant meaning that making a goal more challenging,
while still being reasonable, has a positive effect on agents’ production. This shows that the
effect of the goal setting treatment on production directly lies on the selection of goals in line
with our theoretical model.
TABLE O6. Linear panel regressions for production as a function of goals
(Goal setting treatment).
Goal setting treatment
Reasonable goals in:
+/-1 table
+/-2 tables
+/-3 tables
Constant
338.81***
344.01***
336.33***
(55.48)
(57.29)
(54.42)
Goal Value (ȼ)
-0.03
-0.04
-0.05
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
Reasonable Goal Dummy†
-127.44**
-134.50***
-71.86*
(63.49)
(46.25)
(37.68)
Reasonable Goal Dummy×Goal Value (ȼ)
0.40*
0.39***
0.20*
(0.22)
(0.14)
(0.11)
Contract offer
Performance pay
1.64*
1.66*
1.84*
(0.97)
(1.02)
(0.98)
Number of observations
138
138
138
R²
0.04
0.06
0.05
χ²
12.66**
14.99***
9.72**
†

The reasonable goal dummy takes value 1 if goal is defined as reasonable according to the given definition (+/-1
table, +/-2 tables or +/- 3 tables).
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

O.2.2. On the “piling-up” effect of goal setting
In Figure E1 we show the cumulative distribution function for production on the work task. We
observe that production levels are more concentrated in the goal setting treatment than in the
baseline. The standard deviation of production and the coefficient of variation are significantly
lower in the goal setting treatment (SD = 148.4, CV = 0.36) than in the baseline (SD = 179.2, CV
= 0.55) (F(122,114)= 1.46, p-value=0.04). This result is consistent with previous goal setting
theoretical works (e.g. Wu et al. 2008, Section 4, pages 15-19) finding that production “piles up”
around the goal implying that goal setting decreases the dispersion in production.
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Figure O1. Cumulative distribution functions for production by treatment.
Figure O1 also shows that the difference in production across treatments is particularly large
for low production levels. A significant proportion of agents (21.1%) produced less than 200¢
per period in the baseline, whereas these low levels of production are almost non-existent in the
goal setting treatment (2.9%, Proportion test, p-value <0.01). Thus, goal setting seems to be
especially effective motivating agents who would have produced very little in an environment
with only monetary incentives.
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